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Non-Technical Summary
Rate cutting reforms of the corporate income tax are the outcome of complex
political decision making processes. Therefore, governments tend to choose
their tax rate at one point in time to then keep it constant for a couple of
years. The tax setting behavior of governments therefore can be described
as a discrete choice decision problem. We offer a simple empirical framework
that relates a government’s decision whether to cut its corporate tax rate to
the country’s own inherited tax and taxes in neighboring countries. Thus, our
approach directly addresses the discrete political decisions that eventually has
lead to what is one of the most intensely debated issues in corporate taxation
in Europe: national governments being engaged in a step-by-step process of
cutting the statutory corporate income tax rate.
Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in 32 European countries
since 1980, our empirical results indicate that the probability for tax rate
reductions among European countries strongly depends on a country’s relative
position in terms of the tax burden on corporate income. In particular, high
tax countries are significantly more likely to reduce their tax rates. Moreover,
we find striking evidence for a direct effect of tax rates set by competing
countries on a given country’s willingness to reduce its own tax. If other
countries cut their taxes, a given country’s probability to react by cutting
its own tax is increased. A further insight relates to the political economic
dimensions of tax rate adjustments. Our results indicate that corporate tax
cuts are significantly more likely during election campaigns, suggesting that
they are part of popular economic programmes.
Taken together, our findings strongly support the view that part of the re-
cent downward trend in corporate tax rates in Europe is induced by direct
interaction among governments in setting corporate income tax rates. Most
importantly, the results show that national policies regarding rate cutting tax
reforms in Europe since 1980 are strongly affected by pressures resulting from
tax policies of other countries. The main advancement relative to previous
empirical work is that, by using a discrete choice decision framework and fo-
cusing on rate cutting tax reforms rather than statutory tax rates, we provide
direct evidence on a step-by-step process of cutting statutory rates.
Zusammenfassung (Summary in German)
Steuerreformen, die zur Absenkung des Unternehmensteuersatzes fu¨hren, sind
Ergebnisse komplexer politischer Entscheidungsprozesse. Daher tendieren Re-
gierungen dazu, einen einmal gewa¨hlten Steuersatz fu¨r eine la¨ngere Zeit bei-
zubehalten. Die Wahl des optimalen Unternehmensteuersatzes kann daher als
ein diskretes Entscheidungsproblem betrachtet werden. Diese Untersuchung
basiert auf einem empirischen Modell, welches den Zusammenhang zwischen
der Entscheidung einer Regierung, ob sie den Steuersatz senken solle, mit
dem bestehenden eigenen Steuerniveau und den Steuersa¨tzen der benach-
barten Staaten analysiert. Dieser Ansatz betrachtet folglich direkt die poli-
tischen Entscheidungen, welche mo¨glicherweise zu dem intensiv diskutierten
Pha¨nomen gefu¨hrt haben, wonach sich die Regierungen in Europa in einem
Prozess der schrittweisen Senkungen ihrer Unternehmensteuersa¨tze befinden.
Die Analyse basiert auf einem umfangreichen Datensatz von Unternehmen-
steuerreformen im Zeitraum 1980 bis 2007 in bis zu 32 europa¨ischen Staaten.
Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit fu¨r Senkun-
gen des tariflichen Unternehmensteuersatzes stark von der relativen Posi-
tion der Unternehmensteuerbelastung eines Landes abha¨ngt. Insbesondere
Hochsteuerla¨nder sind deutlich eher geneigt ihren Unternehmensteuersatz zu
senken. Zudem findet sich starke Evidenz fu¨r einen direkten Effekt der Ho¨he
der Steuersa¨tze in konkurrierenden Standorten auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit
einer Steuersatzsenkung. Falls andere konkurrierende La¨nder ihren Steuer-
satz senken, dann steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Steuerreform in einem
gegebenen Land signifikant an. Des weiteren verdeutlichen die Ergebnisse
einen polit-o¨konomischen Aspekt von Steuerreformen. Senkungen der Un-
ternehmensteuer sind viel wahrscheinlicher in Zeiten des Wahlkampfs, was da-
rauf hindeutet, dass solche Reformen vielfach Teil von popula¨ren Wirtschafts-
programmen in Wahlka¨mpfen sind.
Zusammenfassend unterstu¨tzen unsere Ergebnisse die Sichtweise, dass der ak-
tuelle Trend hin zu niedrigeren Unternehmensteuersa¨tzen in Europa teilweise
durch direkte Interaktionen zwischen der Steuerpolitik der einzelnen Regierun-
gen erkla¨rt werden kann. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutlich, dass die Politik
der europa¨ischen Einzelstaaten im Bezug auf Steuersatzsenkungen unter dem
Druck der Steuerpolitik konkurrierender Staaten steht. Der Fortschritt der
vorliegenden empirischen Analyse ist insbesondere darin zu sehen, dass durch
die explizite Beru¨cksichtigung des diskreten Charakters von Steuerreforment-
scheidungen und der klaren Fokussierung auf Senkungen der tariflichen Steuer-
sa¨tze direkte Evidenz zum Schrittweisen Senkungsprozess der Unternehmen-
steuersa¨tze herausgearbeitet wird.
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Abstract
While there is a large and growing number of studies on the determinants of cor-
porate tax rates, the literature has so far ignored the fact that the behavior of
governments in setting tax rates is often best described as a discrete choice deci-
sion problem. We set up an empirical model that relates a government’s decision
whether to cut its corporate tax rate to the country’s own inherited tax and taxes
in neighboring countries. Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in
Europe since 1980, we find evidence suggesting that the position in terms of the tax
burden imposed on corporate income relative to geographical neighbors strongly
affects the probability of rate cutting tax reforms. Countries are particularly likely
to cut their statutory tax rate if the inherited tax is high and if they are exposed
to low-tax neighbors.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades, corporate income tax policies in European countries
have been characterized by frequent rate cutting tax reforms, resulting in a
significant downward trend in statutory tax rates. In that movement, the new
member states of the EU have been among the pioneers of an aggressive low
tax policy. While these facts are hardly disputable, the driving forces behind
what is often perceived as a ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate tax rates are
less clear. Two fundamentally different explanations exist.
First, the downward trend of corporate taxes observable in the EU over the last
25 years may reflect increased competitive pressure on national tax policies.
The literature has discussed several forms of competition leading to cross
border links in tax policies, ranging from capital mobility and the mobility of
profits to yardstick competition (see, e.g., Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano
(2008) and Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2005) for a general discussion and Besley
and Case (1995), Revelli (2001), Revelli (2002), Bordignon, Cerniglia, and
Revelli (2003) and Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) for work addressing yardstick
competition among states and local jurisdictions). These explanations have in
common that they imply a strategic interaction between national governments
so that tax policy decisions of one country trigger reactions of other countries
with a more or less pronounced spatial pattern.
Second - and fundamentally different - the downward trend could equally well
mirror phenomena unrelated to any cross-border links of tax policies among
European countries. The downward trend in corporate tax rates might, for
example, simply express a common intellectual trend regarding the perceived
role of low corporate taxes for national growth and welfare. A further expla-
nation is related to the economic backwardness of new EU member countries
from Central and Eastern Europe. For such economies with an initially low
public and private capital stock, setting low corporate tax rates could reflect
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the fact that investors need to be compensated for otherwise rather disad-
vantageous country characteristics. If this were the major reason behind the
pronounced low-tax policies of the new EU member states, falling corporate
tax rates for the EU average would (at least to some extent) mirror the larger
economic diversity of the enlarged Community and the need for more differ-
entiated national tax policies.
Understanding the forces behind the downward trend in corporate taxes is
crucial for many important policy issues in the EU like the introduction of
minimum taxes and tax harmonization in general. Therefore, our study aims
at testing for the existence of cross-border links in corporate tax policy decision
making. While a sizable part of the empirical tax competition literature has
dealt with the correlation between a given country’s tax rate and taxes of
other countries, we focus on actual decisions of national governments to cut
their country’s corporate tax rate. Compared to the estimation of tax reaction
functions our approach more directly addresses the discrete political decisions
that eventually has lead to what is one of the most intensely debated issues
in corporate taxation in Europe: national governments being engaged in a
step-by-step process of cutting the statutory corporate income tax rate from
an average of well above 45% in 1980 to merely 24% in 2007.
While controlling for a number of country characteristics and unobserved het-
erogeneity, our empirical model relates an indicator for rate cutting reforms
to a country’s own tax rate and neighbors’ taxes. We therefore test to what
degree a country’s position in terms of the tax burden on corporate income
relative to its geographical neighbors affects the probability of rate cutting tax
reforms. Focusing on rate cutting tax reforms is advantageous for a simple
reason: Since they are the outcome of complex political decision making pro-
cesses, tax rates are characterized by substantial inertia, i.e. in many countries
they do not change very frequently. From a practical point of view, the tax
setting behavior of governments should therefore be described as a discrete
choice decision problem rather than a process of continuous adjustment of
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taxes to optimal levels. Moreover, if governments tend to choose their tax
rate at one point in time to then keep it constant for a couple of years, one
might well overstate the actual degree of interaction in the choice of the tax
rate by collecting data over many years and treating observations for a given
country as independent observations.
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first analysis of the determinants
of rate cutting tax reforms. However, our study is closely related to other
contributions to the well established and fast growing literature on the deter-
minants of corporate tax policy. A first strand of relevant literature deals with
the impact of increased economic integration on corporate tax rates. Rodrik
(1997), Swank and Steinmo (2002), Slemrod (2004), Winner (2005), Schwarz
(2007) and Ghinamo, Panteghini, and Revelli (2007) all find that increased
openness is associated with lower levels of company tax rates1, thus providing
suggestive evidence on the role of international tax competition in shaping
national tax policies.
Compared to the abovementioned literature, studies which explicitly test for
interaction in national tax policies are relatively scarce. The common ap-
proach taken in this second strand of literature is to directly estimate tax
reaction functions. Recently, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) have
dealt with competition in statutory tax rates as well as tax levels attributable
to marginal investments among OECD countries. As Redoano (2007), they
find that tax levels are positively related to other countries’ taxes. Similarly,
Egger, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2007) find positively sloped reaction func-
tions for both corporate and personal income taxes. Haufler, Klemm, and
Schjelderup (2006) discuss the effect of capital mobility on the ratio between
corporate income tax to labor income tax and report evidence suggesting that
1Swank and Steinmo (2002) and Bretschger and Hettich (2002, 2005) estimate insignif-
icant effects of capital market liberalization on company tax rates computed in accordance
with the Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) methodology. These results are, however, com-
patible with the tax competition hypothesis since high tax base elasticities can lead to
higher tax revenues despite a decline of tax rates.
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the relative level of a country’s corporate tax develops in accordance to the
worldwide average of corporate tax rates over time.
Our results indicate that the probability for tax rate reductions among Eu-
ropean countries strongly depends on a country’s relative position in terms
of the tax burden on corporate income. In particular, high tax countries are
significantly more likely to reduce their tax rates. Across various specifica-
tions and estimators, we find a country to be 2.1 to 2.6 percentage points
more likely to cut its tax rate if the actual rate is one percentage point higher
compared to a country that is identical in all other respects. Moreover, we
find striking evidence for a direct effect of tax rates set by competing countries
on a given country’s willingness to reduce its own tax. If other countries cut
their taxes by one percentage point on average, a given country’s probability
to react by cutting its own tax is increased by 1.5 to 3.2 percentage points.
Taken together, our findings strongly support the view that part of the re-
cent downward trend in corporate tax rates in Europe is induced by direct
interaction among governments in setting corporate income tax rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the trends in
corporate taxation in Europe since 1980. In Section 3, we discuss our empirical
approach and the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Corporate taxation and tax reforms in Europe, 1980-2007
The statutory corporate income tax rate (STR) is the most prominent measure
for a country’s tax burden on corporate income. It affects effective average
and effective marginal tax rates, which are relevant for location and, respec-
tively, investment decisions of firms (see Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Devereux
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Figure 1: Average statutory corporate income tax rate in European countries, 1980-2007
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Graph shows unweighted average of statutory corporate income tax rates. Western Euro-
pean countries considered (period): AT (81-07), BE (80-07), CH (80-07), CY (91-07), DK
(80-07), ES (91-07), FI (80-07), FR (80-07), DE (80-07), GR (90-07), IE (80-07), IS (90-07),
IT (80-07), LU (80-07), MT (94-07), NL (80-07), NO (90-07), PT (90-07), TR (96-07), SE
(82-07), UK (80-07). Eastern European countries: BG (93-07), CZ (92-07), EE (95-07),
HR (95-07), HU (92-07), LV (95-07), LT (95-07), PL (92-07), RO (94-07), SI (95-07), SK
(92-07).
and Lockwood, 2006).2 Furthermore, the STR directly impacts multinational
companies’ incentives to shift paper profits among affiliates.
Figure 1 depicts average statutory corporate income tax rates in Europe since
1980.3 The graph covers up to 32 countries including the 27 EU member states
and, in addition, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and Switzerland.
2The statutory tax rate neglects any difference in the determination of the tax base
and the existence of non-income taxes. Although these provisions of a tax system are also
important determinants of effective tax rates, a cut of the statutory tax rate leads to lower
effective tax rates holding other things equal provided that the provisions determining the
tax base are not outstandingly favorable.
3We use the headline tax rates of the corporate income tax adjusted for surcharges
and typical local income taxes, which are imposed on the same or a similar tax base.
The computation of the STR accounts for local income taxes as the IRAP in Italy or the
Gewerbesteuer in Germany.
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In 1980, the mean statutory tax rate based on 11 Western European coun-
tries was 45.6%. By 2007, the mean statutory tax rate among 32 European
countries has decreased to 24.1%.
The Eastern European countries have been particular aggressive in reducing
statutory rates.4 The Czech Republic has reduced its statutory rate nine times
since 1992, followed by Bulgaria and Poland with eight and seven reforms,
respectively. On average, the 11 Eastern European countries considered in
this study have reduced their tax rates from 31.5% in 1996 to 18.9% in 2007.
During the same period, the 21 considered Western European countries have
lowered their mean statutory tax rate from 36.3% to 26.8%.
Note that our definition of a tax rate cut accounts for institutional features of
the corporate tax system in countries where the observed overall tax burden on
corporate income may vary even if there is no change in national tax policies.
In particular, in countries with local business income taxes, we only consider
countrywide reforms of the local tax, but we do not consider changes which
are merely modifications at the local level. With this definition, in the 32
countries considered 148 tax rate cuts occurred between 1981 and 2007. On
average, national governments have cut their corporate tax rate every four
years.
Figure 2 depicts, for all years considered, the fraction of countries that actu-
ally lowered their tax rate. Particular intensive rate cutting activities have
occurred between 1989 and 1994 and since 1998. In contrast, during the mid
1990s only very few tax rate cuts were observed. Only the transformation
economies in Eastern Europe intensively reduced their statutory tax rates.
Since 1998, our data show a general tendency towards intensified rate cutting
activities with no particular geographical pattern.
4See Devereux (2007) for further evidence and related discussion and Bellak and
Leibrecht (2008) for evidence on FDI flows induced by low-tax policies by Eastern Eu-
ropean countries.
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Figure 2: Fraction of tax rate cutting countries, 1981-2007
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The bars depict the fraction of tax rate cutting countries in all countries for which tax data
are available. For details on sample composition see notes below Figure 1.
3 Empirical approach and data
3.1 Empirical model
Our empirical analysis aims at identifying the key determinants of rate cut-
ting tax reforms among European countries. As discussed above, a sizable re-
cent literature has analyzed the determinants of countries’ business tax rates,
focussing on the forces of globalization in general and other countries’ tax
policies in particular. Most contributions come to the conclusion that inter-
national competition for firms and capital investment has significantly con-
tributed to the remarkable decline of statutory tax rates in Europe since the
1980s. If this claim is correct, we should be able to go one step further and
model a government’s discrete decision to implement a rate cutting tax reform
(or not to implement such a reform) as a function of the country’s relative po-
sition in terms of the tax burden on corporate income.5 Based on the available
5Note that there are 23 cases in our sample where countries actually increased their
corporate tax rate. Since we are interested in the determinants of tax cutting reforms, we
treat them as ‘no-reform’ cases.
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empirical evidence on international tax competition, we expect to find sup-
port for two key hypotheses. First, governments of high tax countries should
be more likely to reduce taxes. Second, governments should react to taxes
set by neighbors. In particular, a country that is exposed to neighbors with
low taxes is expected to cut its own tax rate with higher probability than an
otherwise identical country exposed to high-tax neighbors.
We take a straightforward approach to test these hypotheses and model the
policies of national governments regarding corporate taxation as being sub-
ject to adjustment pressure originating from various sources. Among them,
there are external forces such as other countries’ tax policies and the chang-
ing degree of mobility of relevant tax bases. Internal forces result from the
political-economic situation (such as the ideology of the parties in power or
pressure related to the timing of elections) or socio-economic factors such as,
for instance, the demographic situation. The model is based on the idea that
an adjustment of the tax rate occurs if the adjustment pressure exceeds a
critical level.
Formally, a government’s decision to reduce the country’s business tax rate is
modeled as a discrete choice decision problem and captured in an econometric
model using a standard latent variable framework. Suppose that the observ-
able decision to either cut the corporate tax rate, yit, or not to do so is related
to the latent predisposition towards lowering taxes, y∗it, according to
yit = 1[y
∗
it > 0], i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T (1)
where 1[·] is the indicator function. Suppose furthermore that a government’s
predisposition towards reducing the statutory tax rate in country i and period
t is a function of the corporate tax rate inherited from the previous period,
τi,t−1, and of a linear combination of other countries’ corporate tax rates in
t − 1, τ−i,t−1 =
∑
j wijτj,t−1, where the wij’s are predetermined weights com-
plying to wii = 0 and
∑
j wij = 1. Adding a vector of exogenous country or
government characteristics xi,t−1, a common period-specific effect ηt, an un-
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observable country-specific effect ci and a residual uit and choosing a linear
specification for the latent variable provides us with
y∗it = ατi,t−1 + βτ−i,t−1 + xi,t−1γ + ηt + ci + uit, (2)
where α, β and γ are the (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated. Note that
the explanatory variables all enter the estimation equation with a one-period
lag relative to the dependent variable. This is to account for the fact that
implementing a tax reform is likely to involve some time lag. Note furthermore
that including a common period-specific effect as well as an unobservable
country-specific effect is arguably the most promising way to ensure that our
estimates are robust to the likely presence of common trends in tax reform
policies as well as unobserved heterogeneity among countries.
In the following section we report results for probit, fixed effects logit and
linear probability models. Applying the linear probability model to discrete
choice decision problems may not seem appropriate from a technical perspec-
tive.6 However, from a practical point of view it is worth mentioning that in
most applications the linear probability model tends to give marginal effects
that are very close to those derived from more sophisticated models for dis-
crete responses. We will discuss the choice of the estimator in more detail in
Section 4.
Equation (2) employs spatial weights that for each country determine the
tax rate of a composite neighbor, i.e. a weighted average of other contries’
statutory tax rates. It is common in the empirical tax competition litera-
ture to define the weights according to some inverse measure of distance.7
The most common inverse distance measure is the common border criterion.
Unfortunately, some European countries do not have any contiguous neigh-
6For a thorough discussion of the various approaches to estimate discrete response mod-
els see Maddala (1983).
7A distinctive advantage of weighting schemes relying on some measure of geographical
distance (compared to various measures of similarity in terms of country characteristics)
is that geographical conditions can safely be regarded as being exogenously given in most
applications.
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bor, making it impossible to apply the common border criterion to European
countries without further assumptions. Furthermore, given the intuition say-
ing that larger countries should exert a stronger influence on other countries’
tax policies than smaller countries, and that, at the same time, geographical
close neighbors should be more influential than those far apart, we use a simple
proximity measure based on geographical distance and adjusted for differences
in country size. Note that using weights which are differentiated according to
geographical distance is in line with empirical evidence showing that distance
negatively affects FDI (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002).
Moreover, geographical distance should also negatively affect the intensity of
transactions that are used to disguise pure paper-profit shifting.
Formally, the weights are determined as follows. With dij denoting the dis-
tance between the capitals of countries i and j in kilometers, and pop being
total population, we set wij = 0 if j = i and
wij =
ln(popj)/d
2
ij∑
k 6=i ln(popk)/d
2
ik
∀ j 6= i. (3)
The denominator scales the wij’s such that
∑
j wij = 1. Geographical distance
is squared to make the weights being more ‘selective’ in terms of distance,
i.e. to differentiate more strongly between geographically close and more dis-
tant countries of equal population size as neighbors of a given country. The
inclusion of population size ensures that, in terms of their weights in the
computation of composite neighbors’ taxes, the contribution of very small
countries like Luxembourg or Malta is discounted relative to big countries like
France or Germany (holding distance fixed).
In order to give two examples for how the weighting scheme works in prac-
tice, consider the composite neighbor of Germany according to Equation (3).
Sorted according to their weights, it has Poland (19%), the Czech Repub-
lic (17%), France (11%), the UK (9%), the Netherlands (6%), Denmark (6%),
Italy (5%), and Austria (4%). The remaining 23% are scattered among the re-
maining countries (weights less than 4%). To give a second example, the com-
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posite neighbor of Sweden is headed by Germany (28%), followed by Poland
(13%), Finland (7%), the UK (7%), Norway (6%), France (6%), and Denmark
(4%), leaving 28% scattered. On average, the weights of the five geographically
closest neighbors of a country add up to 75%.
Note that our approach to define the weights differs from the one taken by
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) and Redoano (2007), who argue
in favor of uniform weights. Apart from economic intuition, there are also
technical reasons to prefer differentiated weights. With uniform weights, β is
not identified in the presence of common period-specific shocks. Technically,
differentiated weights allow for cross-sectional variation of τ−i, and a potential
impact of neighbors’ taxes on a given country’s tax policy can be identified
even in the presence of common period effects.
3.2 Data
Our data cover up to 32 European countries for the period from 1980 to
2007. The sample includes all 27 member states of the European Union and is
extended by Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and Switzerland. During the
1980s the sample consists of western and northern European countries. The
first year with a complete record for all 32 countries is 1996.
As our dependent variable, we employ a binary variable which takes value one
in case of a cut in the statutory tax rate and zero in all other cases. Table 1
provides some descriptive statistics.
Our choice of additional control variables is guided by the need to take account
of factors which could play a role in increasing or decreasing the pressure to
cut the corporate tax rate. First, we consider several general country charac-
teristics. As measures of country size, we include both GDP and population.
We expect that the larger a country the less it is subject to forces from ex-
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition/Type Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Tax rate cut Indicator 620 0.239 0.427 0 1
Own tax Statutory corporate income 652 0.348 0.110 0.100 0.659
rate tax rate adj. for surcharges
Composite Weighted average of other 652 0.360 0.080 0.197 0.585
neighbor’s European countries’
tax rate statutory tax rates
PITR Personal top income tax rate 648 0.483 0.123 0.160 0.870
GDP GDP in billions of purchasing 648 305.5 435.7 3.1 2,317
power parities (PPP)
Population Total number of inhabitants 652 19,240 23,698 255 82,520
in thousand persons
Population Fraction of population 652 0.669 0.019 0.588 0.720
between 15 between 15 and 65 years
and 65 years
Public Total public consumption 635 0.199 0.039 0.095 0.3
consumption as fraction of GDP
Election Indicator 595 0.518 0.500 0 1
period
Government: Indicator 586 0.358 0.480 0 1
Left
Government: Indicator 586 0.423 0.494 0 1
Right
Government: Indicator 586 0.138 0.345 0 1
Center
Government: Indicator 586 0.080 0.272 0 1
Other
Capital Sum of inward and outward 522 0.114 0.659 -0.079 10.93
mobility foreign direct investment as
proportion of GDP
Trade Sum of exports and imports 652 0.931 0.463 0.357 3.13
openness as fraction of GDP
Feldstein- Diff. between savings and 566 0.043 0.038 0 0.257
Horioka investments as fraction of GDP
Sample includes 32 European countries with observations ranging from 1980 to 2007. Tax variables based
on own calculations. Information on countries’ tax systems has been collected from several databases
provided by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), Amsterdam, and from surveys
annually provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. The information on FDI flows is taken from World
Development Indicators of the World Bank. The other control variables are taken from Eurostat and
augmented by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Indicators for government ideology and
election years are obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, 2001).
ternal competition. The size of government is measured as the ratio of public
consumption to GDP. If the size of government increases, the leeway for tax
cuts shrinks. Hence, we expect a negative coefficient. Furthermore, the age
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structure of the population could influence tax policy due to budgetary effects
of demographic change. Theory does not, however, suggest a particular sign
for the coefficient.
In addition, we consider several politico-economic factors which may influence
the probability of a tax reform. In particular, we consider an indicator for
election periods.8 It is well known from the literature on political business
and budget cycles that governments tend to be particular generous in lection
or pre-election years. In general, this should also hold with respect to the
likely timing of tax cuts. However, the election year effect is less clear for
corporate tax policy because tax cuts for companies might be criticized by
voters from a distributive point of view and thus be less popular in the course
of an ongoing election campaign. Hence, the sign prediction is ambiguous.
Moreover, government ideology may affect the probability of corporate tax
reductions. From the perspective of income redistribution, left parties can be
expected to be less inclined to cut taxes for companies.
Finally, we employ three different indicators for openness since previous liter-
ature has found more open countries to have lower corporate taxes. Irrespec-
tive of how openness is actually measured, the degree of economic integration
should matter for tax policies, with the expected sign being positive.
4 Results
As mentioned in the previous section, there are various approaches to esti-
mate the coefficients and corresponding marginal effects of our discrete choice
model of corporate income tax cuts in Europe. The key difficulty is the likely
presence of unobserved country-specific effects, such as, for instance, a gen-
8Technically, the indicator covers both the election and the pre-election year. Tax policy
decisions in these two years can be expected to be influenced by similar forces related to a
government’s reputation and popularity.
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Table 2: Corporate income tax cuts and neighbors’ taxes: Baseline estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit (dP/dx) LPM FE Logit FE LPM
Own tax rate 1.234??? 1.144??? 20.05??? 2.244???
(0.303) (0.237) (3.003) (0.393)
Composite neighbor’s tax rate -0.535 -0.438 -13.33??? -1.266
(0.613) (0.591) (4.991) (0.769)
Number of observations 597 597 584 597
(Pseudo) R2 0.09 0.09 - 0.13
The table shows marginal effects (slopes evaluated at sample means) in Column (1) and coefficients in
Columns (2)-(4). Standard errors in parentheses (Column (1): robust to serial correlation; Column (2)
and (4): robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation). All estimations include a full series of period
effects. Column (4) in addition includes a full series of country effects. All regressions use observations from
1983 to 2007.
??? 1% significance level.
eral predisposition towards lowering tax rates that cannot be accounted for
by observable country characteristics. Unfortunately, the options to account
for additive unobserved heterogeneity across countries are somewhat limited in
the standard models for discrete responses such as probit and logit. Therefore,
we will report results using a variety of estimators, ranging from pooled probit
to fixed effects logit and linear probability models. Compared to estimators
that are designed to properly account for discrete responses, the linear proba-
bility model (LPM) has two attractive features: the parameter estimates are
easy to interpret, and the fact that the model is linear allows for the inclusion
of country fixed effects.
To get a first impression of the performance of the different models, Table 2
depicts the results of four baseline estimations. Note that we have not included
any control variables apart from countries’ own and neighbors’ taxes. Column
(1) reports a simple probit. Since there is no option to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in the probit framework, we report a standard probit on the
pooled data. Note, however, that we include a full series of year effects. For
ease of interpretation, we show average partial effects evaluated at sample
means and corresponding standard errors. We note that the simple probit
points to a positive impact of a country’s inherited tax on the probability
to cut the corporate income tax rate. However, the null of no impact of
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neighbors’ tax rates cannot be rejected. Column (2) repeats the baseline
estimation without accounting for country-specific time-invariant effects using
a linear probability model. As expected, the results are very similar to those
in Column (1).
As unobserved country characteristics can be expected to play an important
role in shaping the countries’ tax policies, we now add country-specific effects.
Column (3) shows coefficients derived from a fixed effects (FE) logit as the
standard approach to control unobserved heterogeneity in limited dependent
variable models. Note that we can make use of our data only beginning with
1983 as the countries in the sample did not reduce their statutory tax rates
in 1981 and 1982. There is only one country, Malta, that kept its tax rate
constant over the whole period for which information on the statutory rate
is available. These observations cannot be used by the conditional maximum
likelihood procedure of the FE logit, reducing the effective sample size to
584 observations. The FE logit has the drawback that one cannot compute
average partial effects without specifying a distribution for the unobserved
effects. Column (3) therefore provides only qualitative evidence. Interestingly
enough, the FE logit baseline estimation uncovers a significant negative effect
of neighbors’ tax rates on the probability for a tax rate reduction. Thus, the
FE logit baseline estimation provides the first piece of suggestive evidence that
both expected effects (higher probability of tax cuts for high tax countries and
countries exposed to low tax neighbors) might be present in our data. Finally,
we also estimated a linear probability model incorporating a full series of coun-
try effects, shown in Column (4). Note that both coefficients are significantly
larger compared to those reported for the LPM without country effects in
Column (2). Moreover, the negative effect of neighbors’ tax rates is now close
to being significant at the 10% level. From the series of baseline estimations
we draw the conclusion that it seems to be of crucial importance to account
for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Given that and the applied
nature of our endeavor, we rely on the fixed effects linear probability model
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to provide further evidence on the determinants of statutory tax reforms.
Table 3 summarizes the results of four additional estimations of the FE LPM.
The estimations differ in terms of the measure for the openness of countries.
As discussed above, a sizable literature has analyzed the effect of openness
on corporate tax rates in Europe. When estimating the direct impact of
neighbors’ tax rates on the decision to cut the statutory tax rate, we certainly
need to take account of the potential impact of openness itself. Since many
different measures for openness have been proposed, we checked the robustness
of our results using various of these measures.
Column (1) reports an estimation with our full set of controls including the
common trade-based openness measure, i.e. the sum of exports and imports
divided by GDP. In addition, we account for a full series of country and year
effects. First of all, the results point to a significant positive impact of the
inherited statutory rate on the probability of a tax cut. We estimate a country
with an inherited statutory rate being one percentage point higher than that of
an otherwise identical country to be 2 percentage points more likely to reduce
its tax rate. Hence, high tax countries, all other things equal, are significantly
more likely to cut their taxes than low tax countries. Secondly, we note a
negative effect of the tax rate of the composite neighbor on a given country’s
reform probability. A one-percentage point decrease in neighbors’ average tax
rate makes a statutory tax rate cut 1.5 percentage points more likely. Note,
however, that the trade-based openness measure is far from being significant
as an independent explanatory variable. Using different openness measures
may therefore affect the evidence regarding the impact of tax competition.
Column (2) depicts a second set of results, with openness now measured as
the difference between total savings and total investment in absolute value
divided by GDP, as suggested by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). Note that the
Feldstein-Horioka measure turns out to be statistically significant. However,
contrary to our expectations, more open economies show a lower probability to
cut corporate taxes than less open economies. More importantly, our results
17
Table 3: Corporate income tax cuts and neighbors’ taxes: Linear probability model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own tax rate 2.214??? 2.132??? 2.101??? 2.210???
(0.448) (0.452) (0.473) (0.440)
Composite neighbor’s tax rate -1.533?? -1.855?? -1.810?? -1.704??
(0.690) (0.793) (0.799) (0.734)
Public consumption -0.104 0.247 0.839 -0.427
(1.264) (1.330) (1.386) (1.361)
log(GDP) 0.145 0.418 0.583 0.384
(0.242) (0.381) (0.386) (0.403)
log(POP) 0.530 0.517 0.226 1.332
(0.905) (1.029) (1.024) (0.917)
Population between 15 and 65 years 4.050 0.859 0.440 1.597
(2.629) (3.613) (3.945) (4.067)
Opennessa 0.161 -2.682??? -3.621??? -0.028
(0.244) (0.831) (1.078) (0.053)
Election period 0.119??? 0.122??? 0.128??? 0.104???
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032)
Government: Right 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050
(0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.061)
Government: Center 0.065 0.041 0.041 0.022
(0.095) (0.091) (0.093) (0.102)
Government: Other 0.104 0.117 0.073 0.121
(0.125) (0.145) (0.147) (0.135)
Number of observations 538 482 474 478
R2 (within) 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17
Table shows coefficients and standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) for the linear
probability model. All estimations include a full series of country and period effects. Regression shown by
Column (1) use observations from 1983 to 2007, the regressions shown by Columns (2)-(4) use observations
from 1983 to 2006 (varying effective sample size is due to missing values in explanatory variables).
a Openness measured as: Column (1): sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. Column (2): difference
between total savings and total investment in absolute value divided by GDP. Column (3): three-year
moving average of difference between total savings and total investment in absolute value divided by GDP.
Column (4): sum of inward and outward FDI (annual flows) divided by GDP.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
regarding the role of own and neighbors’ taxes in shaping the willingness
to cut the statutory tax rate proves to be highly robust to the alternative
measurement of openness. In fact, the partial impact of neighbors’ taxes on
the probability of reform is now estimated to be even larger.
Further estimations substantiating the previous results are shown in the re-
maining columns. In Column (3), we use a three-year moving average of the
Feldstein-Horioka measure to account for the cyclical movement of savings,
investment, and GDP. The results are almost identical to those obtained in
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Column (2). Column (4) uses a fourth measure of openness, namely the sum
of inward and outward FDI (annual flows) divided by GDP. Again, the re-
sults are similar to those discussed before. Even the magnitude of the tax
competition effect does not change much across specifications.
Apart from the effects mentioned so far our results also point to an interesting
political economy effect on national tax policies: Consistent across all reported
specifications, the probability for a cut in corporate taxes is 10 to 13 percent-
age points more likely in election periods. Thus, the pattern of a generous
budgetary policy in election periods is supported with respect to corporate
tax cuts. The interpretation of this effect is somewhat difficult, as corporate
tax cuts are unlikely to be particularly popular among the electorate. Pos-
sibly, however, they are an ingredient of expansionary fiscal packages often
observed prior to a general election.
We complete the discussion of our results by some robustness checks. First
of all, we need to make sure that our findings are not specific to the linear
probability model. As mentioned above, the FE LPM was chosen for the
reason that it allows to account for unobserved country-specific effects and, at
the same time, gives coefficient estimates which are easy to interpret. Column
(1) in Table 4 provides the estimated coefficients of a FE logit that accounts for
the full set of controls.9 Again, we can only provide qualitative evidence on the
effects of interest. We note that the FE logit gives highly significant parameter
estimates confirming qualitatively our previous findings on the impact of tax
competition on the willingness to cut the statutory business tax rate.
A second issue is the potential endogeneity of the tax rate variables on the
right hand side of our estimation equation. Although we control for a number
of country characteristics as well as year and country effects, there might still
be unobserved variables driving a given country’s willingness to cut taxes and,
at the same time, affecting the country’s own as well as neighbors’ statutory
9Note that we have used the three-year moving average of the Feldstein-Horioka measure
here. Using a different openness measure gives very similar results.
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Table 4: Corporate income tax cuts and neighbors’ taxes: Fixed effects logit and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Estimator FE logit 2SLS 2SLS
Own tax rate 27.79??? 2.581??? 2.078?
(4.525) (0.500) (1.178)
Composite neighbor’s tax rate -22.93??? -3.184?? -2.331?
(6.647) (1.454) (1.393)
Years 1983-2007 1982-2007 1981-2007
Number of observations 439 453 471
R2 (within) - 0.20 0.20
IV for τi - lagged STR PITR
IV for τ−i - neighbors’ pop. neighbors’ PITR
First stage results:
1st stage for τi - 250.1 44.2F -Statistic for IVs:
1st stage for τ−i - 38.5 170.8
IV for τi - 0.81 (0.04) 0.39 (0.07)Coefficients of IVs:
IV for τ−i - 0.14 (0.02) 0.005 (0.0003)
Table shows estimated coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses, robust for 2SLS). All estimations
include a full series of period effects and all additional controls reported in Column (3) of Table 2. Columns
(2) and (3) also include a full series of country effects.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
tax rates. Since such correlation would cast doubt on the consistency of our
parameter estimates, we construct instruments for the potentially endogenous
variables to be used in first stage regressions of two-stage least squares (2SLS)
procedures.
A first set of instruments consists of the one-period lag of the statutory tax
rate and neighbors’ average population (in logs).10 As the literature on the de-
terminants of the corporate tax rate has shown, tax rates tend to be positively
related to measures of country size. We use population figures to construct
the instrument for neighbors’ taxes as neighbors’ population is arguably ex-
ogenous in our tax reform equation. Results from a 2SLS estimation using
these instruments are reported in Column (2).
While there seems little reason to doubt the validity of neighbors’ population
10Recall that all explanatory variables enter the model with a one-period lag relative to
the indicator for a tax rate reduction in the current period. Hence, we instrument τi,t−1
and τ−i,t−1 by τi,t−2 and ln(pop)−i,t−1.
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as an instrument for neighbors’ taxes, using a country’s own lagged tax rate
as an instrument for the current tax may be questioned. For instance, if the
unobserved factor inducing correlation between the tax rate and the residual
is serially correlated, the instrument will no longer be exogenous. We there-
fore check our estimation results using an alternative set of instruments. In
particular, we use a country’s lagged top personal income tax rate (PITR) and
the corresponding weighted average among neighbors. The choice of this set
of instruments is motivated by the strong empirical association between the
top individual rate and the statutory corporate income tax rate reported, e.g.,
by Slemrod (2004). Estimation outcomes using PITR-related instruments are
shown in Column (3) of Table 4.
We find that both instrumental variables estimations confirm our previous
results. While the estimated coefficients of a country’s own tax are very similar
to those obtained from the FE LPM, the effect of neighbors’ taxes on the
predisposition to cut the statutory tax rate is now estimated to be somewhat
larger. Furthermore, for both sets of instruments the relevant coefficients
from the first stage regressions show the expected sign and prove to be highly
significant, making us confident that we have chosen suitable instruments.
Moreover, the F -statistics of the first stage regressions suggest that we are on
the save side regarding the notorious weak instruments problem.
5 Conclusion
Due to substantial implementation costs, governments do not continuously
adjust tax rates to optimal levels. Rather, descriptive evidence suggests that
governments set taxes to the preferred level in one period and then stick to
the rate chosen for some periods. Consequently, the choice of the tax rate
involves a discrete choice decision problem that has to date been ignored in
the literature dealing with the determinants of corporate tax rates. It is the
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purpose of this study to fill part of this gap.
Focusing on statutory corporate taxes in Europe, we have offered a simple
empirical framework for the analysis of rate cutting tax reforms in a compre-
hensive data set covering 32 countries. Our results suggest that the remarkable
activity of national governments in Europe since 1980 to implement rate cut-
ting reforms was to a significant part driven by tax competition rather than
by alternative explanations such as a common intellectual trend. In particu-
lar, we find that high tax countries experience substantial pressure to reduce
corporate taxes. Furthermore, our findings point to a significant impact of
neighboring countries’ tax policies on the probability for tax rate reductions.
Thus, countries which are geographically close to low tax countries are sub-
stantially more likely to lower their tax rate.
A further insight relates to the political economic dimensions of tax rate ad-
justments. Our results indicate that corporate tax cuts are significantly more
likely during election campaigns, suggesting that they are part of popular
economic programmes subject to some sort of a political business cycle.
Taken together, our study provides evidence on international tax competition
that is complementary to a number of recent studies. Most importantly, the
results show that national policies regarding rate cutting tax reforms in Europe
are strongly affected by pressures resulting from tax policies of other countries.
The main advancement relative to previous empirical work is that, by using
a discrete choice decision framework and focusing on rate cutting tax reforms
rather than statutory tax rates, we provide direct evidence on the step-by-
step process of cutting statutory rates that has often been claimed to be at
the heart of the ‘race to the bottom’ in international tax competition.
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